

Control Number : GOOG-DOJ-AT-00088452
All Custodians : Ali Nasiri Amini
Custodian : Ali Nasiri Amini
Date/Time Created : 10/30/2019 8:34 PM
Date/Time Sent :
MODIFICATION DATE : 10/30/2019 10:07 PM
File Name : auction
..._1uMTEVII9HYlwLkkmQd3EOw
-_9ucZ6uwKB1FF71tjwig.pptx

Part 1:
“Second-Price Auction”
was designed to make
bidding easy!

Google

Bid = value
aka: truthful bidding
(no bidding optimization)

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Second-Price Auctions and “truthful” bidding

If an advertiser **knows** the value of a click/impression to himself,
then in **a second-price** auction, he should just bid this value.

→ Bidding is trivial (no optimization needed)

- Well-celebrated theory.
- Served as a cornerstone of Google’s ad model success in early days.
- Simplifies advertiser problem: Just tell us the value of a click to you.

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Part 2: Uncertainty in value

Advertiser: But all clicks are not equal to me, I don't know the value of a click before auction but if I win I can measure it!

Google


Significant heterogeneity
in value of clicks
especially in display ads.

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How uncertainty in value impacts bidding?

1. Bidding the expected value, **"Truthful bidding"**, is not optimal!
2. It is hard to predict due to **"censored"** training data:

Observed data is biased! We only observe value of clicks that we won, but we need to predict the value of queries that we are competing for.



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Most of

Hidden information of competition


Allstate and Geico are competing on <http://InsuranceReview.com>.
 Geico bids higher for users that already visited its website (Remarketing).

Allstate bids \$1 cpc but sees:

- For 10% of clicks:
 - `cpc` = \$0.95
 - `avg(value)` = \$2
- For 90% of clicks
 - `cpc` = \$0.5
 - `avg(value)` = \$0.89

`avg value over all clicks` = \$1

Google



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Google

These are the clicks that Geico is bidding high on.

These could be the users that have visited Geico before.
 → They have more interest in buying insurance
 → They bring more value for Allstate.



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Should Allstate continue bidding \$1?

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Google

<http://InsuranceReview.com>

If Allstate bids \$1.1,

Wins some **new** clicks with cost in [\$1.0, \$1.1]

They have a \$2 value >> cost

→ Allstate should bid much higher.

Should Allstate continue bidding \$1?

<p>Part 3:</p> <h1>HDMI</h1> <p>HIDDEN DENSITY MODEL OF IMPRESSIONS</p> <p>Google</p>	<p>Building a unifying model of competition and value</p> <p>Confidential + Proprietary</p>
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HDMI: a market model to predict result of any bidding rule




Features:
0010101010010100
1010010010010101
0010010101010100
1010010010100100

Google

Step 1: map user features to few scores/signals
(dimension reduction)


Smartass pCVR,
Brain pCVR,
PEAR pCVR,
...

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HDMI: a market model to predict result of any bidding rule

- Any bidding rule draws a hypersurface that separates the space to “won” vs “lost”.
- The goal of the bidding optimization is to separate in a way that we win all users with $E[\text{Value} - \text{Cost}] > 0$




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Confidential + Proprietary score

HDMI: a market model to predict result of any bidding rule

- **Challenge:** Build a model for market from partial biased data as buyer often has only access only to whatever he won in the past.
- HDMI recognizes this limitation in data and does appropriate correction.



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Part 4:
So “Second price” does not necessarily make the bidding easy

Google



Debate: Should we keep all of our auctions “second price” at any cost?

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Observation: auction discount is much higher on Google Second-price auctions

Exchange	Auction discount = cost / bid
AdX	34%
AdSense	40%
External Exchange	11%

We can not audit the code but we can run experiments to lower the bid on a small fraction of users and see what happens?

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Project Poirot

- **Detective Part:** Poirot explores the auction space using multiple experiments with various z values.
- Experiment data will be fed into a ML to learn how surplus varies vs bid multiplier in various segment of inventory

$$\text{surplus} = \sum_{\text{imp } i} (\text{value}_i - \text{payout}_i)$$


- **Judicial Part:** Poirot acts as a fair judge and adjusts the advertiser's bid in order to maximize surplus



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
Result:



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
Result:



Google

Market shift to first price

Digital Ad Impression Share Among US Supply-Side Platforms (SSPs), by Auction Type, Dec 2017 & March 2018
% of total impressions analyzed by Getintent



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<p>Part 5: Where we are and Where we want to be?</p> <p>Google</p>	<p>What should we do for Google AdX?</p> <p>Confidential + Proprietary</p>
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Where we are

- We started with the second-price auction to make bidding truthful and easy!
- Even with second-price auction bidding is not trivial. (Bidder should actively model the market).
- Second price auctions is not verifiable. (Unless audit the code!).
- The rest of the market is shifting to the first price auction.

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Where we will be

- **Transparent first-price auction:** Highest bidder wins and pays her own bid. But the winner gets to know what the second highest bid was.
- **Advantage:** No need for bid-lowering experiments for price discovery.
- At Google we are converging to this solution as a step forward but we have not seen all the episodes of this show!

Google


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Appendix


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Bidding Optimization





Scores (Prediction signals) and Highest Other Bid (HOB)



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




GDN tcpa



More: search for HDMI on Moma



Google


2018-08-24 10:00:00 [unclassified] [unclassified]

V1 Solutions

- 1) Advertiser can compute $E[\text{value}]$ from historical data and use that as the bid.
- 2) $E[\text{Value}]$ may vary based on many features.

Advertisers have access to small subset of them in UI, we have access to a lot more.

- 1) Tell us the value of past clicks and we build a ML to predict $E[\text{value}]$ of future clicks based on a long list of impression features.




Google

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Optimal Bidding in second price auctions

Previous bids = training data

E[value]	Bid	Highest bid	win	value
\$1	\$1	\$0.9	Y	\$1.5
\$1	\$1	\$0.2	Y	\$0.5
\$1	\$1	\$1.2	N	NA
\$1	\$1	\$1.4	N	NA
...	...			
\$1	\$1	\$0.5	Y	\$1.0



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Using information in highest other bid (HOB)

At the time of bidding the HOB is not known, however
we can calculate expected profit margin for different values for HOB.

There is one value for which the advertiser profit would be zero (break-even point).

By submitting this value as the bid, advertiser buy all of queries with positive
“expected” margin and loses the auction for all queries for which he has negative
expected margin.

HDMI is the system we built for solving such bidding optimization.

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